Please click here to download MARUAH’s statement in PDF.














Published SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
Earlier this month, the Government tabled a Bill to enact the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (Fica).
The legislation, if passed, will provide the Government with the powers to act against foreign interference that comes in the forms of hostile information campaigns and local proxies by foreign entities.
The Bill is underscored by the recognition that foreign interference takes place in both online and offline settings.
The swathe of provisions proposed will provide the Government, specifically the Minister for Home Affairs, with different mechanisms to prevent, detect and disrupt actions by foreign actors who interfere with domestic politics through influence operations.
The directives will be issued to social media companies, electronic services such as instant messaging apps and Internet access providers, and individuals who own or manage websites and blogs.
Given the rise of influence operations — also known as cyber-enabled foreign interference — globally, this Bill does not come as a surprise.
However, while Fica upgrades the Government’s arsenal to counter foreign interference in a digitalised age, it should not do so at the expense of people’s trust in the Government and diminish Singapore’s position as a global hub.
FIGHTING AN EVOLVING THREAT
Tabled two years after the passing of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (Pofma), some might wonder what took Singapore so long to legislate against influence operations, given the prevalence of the problem in other countries.
In the past few years, countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States have introduced or passed bills to curtail foreign interference in elections and infrastructures.
The rapidly evolving nature of influence operations — in terms of the who, how and why — renders existing laws such as Pofma and the Political Donations Act toothless in countering hostile foreign actors.
There is a tendency for people to think of foreign powers as the main perpetrators of foreign influence.
The trend is evident from actions that have been taken by social media companies like Facebook, Twitter and Google (YouTube) to eradicate inauthentic behaviour originating from Russia, Iran, China and Turkey in the past few years.
However, hostile actors are not limited to foreign governments.
Facebook recently shared that most of the covert influence operations in Asia-Pacific are domestic. Research conducted by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute uncovered “apolitical disinformation entrepreneurs” as masterminds.
The toolbox used by perpetrators of influence operations has also expanded.
While the “basic” and more crude forms of tactics, such as bots and fake accounts, are still being used, more covert techniques such as buzz accounts and pop culture fan communities are emerging.
Furthermore, hostile actors are often very adept at mixing and matching tactics, combining them to achieve devastating consequences.
PROTECTING PUBLIC TRUST AND GLOBAL HUB STATUS
To detect, disrupt and stop hostile information campaigns, the Bill includes a wide range of directives.
These include directing social media platforms to disclose information even before the content is published, requiring a person or an Internet intermediary to stop communicating hostile information campaign contents, and requiring services and platforms to restrict the dissemination of such additional content.
Internet service providers can also be ordered to block access to content.
Since the first reading of the Fica Bill, concerns have been raised by different quarters pertaining to the overly broad and expansive definitions of foreign interference and what constitutes political activities.
A petition against Fica which calls for more public consultation via a multi-party parliamentary Select Committee has also been launched.
A provision that merits special discussion is the Technical Assistance Direction that will allow the Government to act on an anticipatory basis.
Research on rumours and conspiracy theories found that the inoculation strategy — exposing individuals to fallacies to prepare them — has been shown to heighten people’s vigilance and scepticism towards false information.
While this directive will help the Government prevent the slow drip effect of influence operations and make a pre-emptive strike as soon as it is aware of suspicious activities, there could be concerns about its opacity and potential overreach.
According to the Bill, a “Technical Assistance Direction can be issued if the Minister suspects that there are preparations or plans to undertake an online communication activity in Singapore by or on behalf of a foreign principal, and the Minister is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to issue the direction”.
The ongoing tussle between the Indian government and WhatsApp over a new law that requires the platform to identify the “first originator of information” when the authorities demand it highlights the potential pushback.
While the Indian government emphasises that the law will only be used to unmask people credibly accused of wrongdoing, WhatsApp has said that the law would require it to break encryption for message receivers as well as message originators.
This will potentially breach privacy protections on the platform.
Fica should specify the situations and the purposes that warrant the issuance of such a direction, or other directions for the matter.
This will help put the public’s mind at ease and promote cooperation from tech platforms.
At the international level, the Government needs to consider the potential effects Fica might have on Singapore as an international hub as well as criticisms about the lack of clarity on what “collaboration” entails.
Part of the wonder of cyberspace is its transboundary nature which makes collaborations on an unprecedented scale possible.
It has spurred the growth of the digital economy, sparked entrepreneurship, advanced academic collaboration and scholarship, and strengthened political alliances.
For example, the free-flowing exchange of ideas and resources form the backbone of the global climate movement.
The movement sparked off the people’s climate march, industry-wide climate activism efforts in different countries as well as grassroots campaigns.
While one cannot establish causation, the sharp gain in the momentum of transnational collaboration could have contributed to the energised global action on climate change.
Therefore, the definition of foreign interference and its measurements would have to be sharp and clear so as not to diminish Singapore’s position as a node in the global network of collaboration and creation.
Since the first reading of the Fica Bill, legal practitioners, activists and academics have raised concerns and offered suggestions on how to refine the Bill.
The Government should take heed and consider how it can strengthen the proposed Act so that it can keep foreign interference at bay while safeguarding people’s trust in it and Singapore’s hub status.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Dr Carol Soon is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies where she heads the Society and Culture department.
Read more at https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/beware-collateral-damage-fica
Published SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
Singapore’s proposed Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) is an overly broad law that grants the Minister for Home Affairs vast powers, with serious repercussions for civil society, independent media, and public discourse.
The bill was introduced in Parliament on 13 September 2021, with its second reading scheduled for 4 October 2021.
We, the undersigned, would like to express the following concerns:
1. An overly broad, expansive law
FICA contains extremely broad definitions that serve as a catch-all for a wide range of activities. If enacted, the law will have serious ramifications for multiple stakeholders and large sections of society, including academia, business, civil society, and the media.
2. Powers to censor, impose restrictions, and demand information
FICA allows the Minister for Home Affairs vast powers to issue directives that can censor online content and even shut down media outlets. All that is required for the issuance of such directions is for the Minister to be of the opinion that online communications activity has been undertaken, or has been suspected of being undertaken, on behalf of a foreign principal, and that it is in the public interest to take action. Compliance with these directions are mandatory; failure to comply will attract heavy fines and/or imprisonment. The offence of non-compliance is arrestable and non-bailable.
The Minister can also declare an online location a “proscribed online location”. This would then make it illegal to monetise, finance, or form commercial partnerships with the platform. In other words, the Minister can effectively shut down any independent media business or initiative by cutting off its sources of funding.
The proposed legislation allows an authority appointed by the Minister to designate individuals or entities “politically significant persons”, who are then subject to reporting obligations and restrictions regarding donations. This designation can only be appealed to the Minister who appointed the authority in the first place.
FICA also grants authorities the right to demand information from any individual, whether inside Singapore or out, for enforcement purposes. Such a broad power can lead to gross violations of privacy.
3. Absence of meaningful oversight of powers granted under FICA
FICA limits the sources of appeal for the exercise of powers under the bill. Appeals are first directed to the Minister for Home Affairs, who can also choose not to consider an appeal if he deems it “frivolous or vexatious”.
The second source of appeal, the Reviewing Tribunal, is appointed by the President on the advice of the Cabinet. However, the Minister for Home Affairs makes the rules followed by the Reviewing Tribunal.
FICA further restricts judicial review in open court to only procedural matters.
4. Our demands
FICA, in its current state, is an example of state overreach without adequate oversight. Given the serious ramifications that such a wide-ranging law will have on multiple segments of society, it is crucial that such a bill be closely scrutinised and thoroughly debated before any decision can be taken as to whether such a far-reaching piece of legislation is even necessary.
It is therefore unacceptable that the bill – which is 249 pages long – is scheduled for its second, and likely third, reading on 4 October. That’s a mere three weeks after it was first introduced in Parliament. This is nowhere near enough time for Members of Parliament, as well as Singaporeans, to have read, analysed, and be consulted on the proposed law.
A multi-party Select Committee should instead be appointed to carry out extensive public consultation on the issue of “foreign interference”. The term should be clearly defined, and measures enacted should take into consideration with best practices in accordance with international human rights standards.
While legislation to combat malign foreign interference is not inherently unreasonable, national security should not be seen as an excuse to concentrate power in the hands of the state. Any law that is enacted should therefore not be overly broad and ambiguous, but targeted, precise, and subject to adequate oversight and restraints on power.
Published SEPTEMBER 26, 2021
Published SEPTEMBER 22, 2021
We have attached a copy of Greenpeace Southeast Asia’s Briefing Paper on Ratifying and Implementing ILO Convention 188 in ASEAN Member States and the cover email below. Please click on the link to download a copy of the report.
Dear ASEAN Secretariat,
In October last year, Greenpeace Southeast Asia (GPSEA) started developing the Briefing Paper on Ratifying and Implementing ILO Convention 188 in ASEAN Member States. We also initiated email correspondence and virtual consultation meetings with the respective sectoral bodies: ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers (ACMW), and the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crimes (SOMTC). Alongside this, workshops were conducted to align views with fellow civil society organisations (CSO) and trade union colleagues.
The briefing paper is jointly submitted by 18 CSOs and trade unions and endorsed by 6 organisations, with the aim of having ASEAN member states join us to fight modern slavery at sea together at the regional level.
It is very unfortunate that none of the AICHR, ACMW, and SOMTC Brunei Darussalam leaders are able to join us in the online launch event due to other commitments. Nevertheless, we are submitting the briefing paper online by way of this email. Please find this document attached.
We really hope that this briefing paper will mark the beginning of further discussions and collaborations between CSOs, trade unions, and ASEAN to combat modern slavery at sea. Therefore, we are looking forward to hearing your response and views on the matter.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Joint-Submitters
Asosiasi Pekerja Perikanan Indonesia (AP2I)
CSO Coalition for Ethical and Sustainable Seafood
Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF)
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
Global Labor Justice – International Labor Rights Form (GLJ-ILRF)
Greenpeace Southeast Asia
Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative (IOJI)
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Bandung (LBH Bandung)
Oxfam International – Asia
Plan International
Serikat Awak Kapal Perikanan Bersatu (Sakti) SULUT
Serikat Awak Kapal Transportasi Indonesia (SAKTI)
Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI)
Serikat Pekerja Perikanan Indonesia (SPPI)
Serikat Pelaut Sulawesi Utara (SPSU)
Stella Maris Manila
The Migrant Workers Rights Network (MWRN)
Verité Southeast Asia
Endorsers
Amnesty International – Indonesia
Destructive Fishing Watch (DFW)
Human Rights Working Group (HRWG)
MARUAH Singapore
Raks Thai Foundation
Solidaritas Perempuan (SP)
Today, 8 September 2021, Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) composed of Judge Joanna Korner, Presiding Judge, Judge Reine Alapini-Gansou and Judge Althea Violet Alexis-Windsor scheduled the opening of the trial in the case The Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”) for 5 April 2022.
Mr Abd-Al-Rahman was transferred to the ICC’s custody on 9 June 2020, after surrendering himself voluntarily in the Central African Republic. His initial appearance before the ICC took place on 15 June 2020. The confirmation of charges hearing was held before Pre-Trial Chamber II from 24 to 26 May 2021. On 9 July 2021, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court unanimously, issued a decision confirming all the charges brought by the Prosecutor against Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”) and committed him to trial before a Trial Chamber.
The 31 charges include intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such, as a war crime; murder as a crime against humanity and as a war crime; pillaging as a war crime; destruction of the property of an adversary as a war crime; other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity; outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime; rape as a crime against humanity and a war crime; forcible transfer as a crime against humanity; persecution as a crime against humanity; torture as a crime against humanity and a war crime; cruel treatment as a war crime; attempted murder as a crime against humanity and a war crime.
For further information on this case, check here.
For further information, please contact Fadi El Abdallah, Spokesperson and Head of Public Affairs Unit, International Criminal Court, by telephone at: +31 (0)70 515-9152 or +31 (0)6 46448938 or by e-mail at: fadi.el-abdallah@icc-cpi.int
You can also follow the Court’s activities on Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, YouTube, Instagram and Flickr
You must be logged in to post a comment.