[Repost] The Strait of Hormuz and the Limits of Maritime Law

3 April 2026

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-strait-of-hormuz-and-the-limits-of-maritime-law

Bertina Kudrin | Monday, March 23, 2026, 10:53 AM

For over 40 years, the Strait of Hormuz has been a geopolitical pressure point. Today’s war, however, has prompted a broader question that extends beyond the conflict: whether international law can regulate economic warfare at sea in an era of globalized commerce. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates how the legal frameworks governing maritime chokepoints face limits when military coercion targets the infrastructure of global trade.

As a result of the war, commercial navigation through the strait has ground to almost a stop, with tanker transits down to zero on some days and hundreds of vessels remaining outside the strait, unable to reach ports. Multiple attacks by Iran have deterred merchant vessels from navigating the strait, with Iran announcing that the strait will “be under control of the Islamic Republic.” These attacks include Shahed drone attacks, missiles, and mines, and even an Iranian attempt to use a remote-controlled boat laden with explosives to target a tanker. 

This combination of attacks on shipping and threats to restrict passage is not new. Similar strategies appeared during World War I, when the United Kingdom imposed a sweeping naval blockade in 1914, intercepting merchant shipping bound for German ports in an effort to weaken Germany’s war economy. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq “Tanker War” of the 1980s, both sides attacked hundreds of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf as part of a strategy to disrupt the other’s energy exports. During the Tanker War, Iran also used mines to threaten commercial shipping lanes—similar to its mining tactics in the Strait of Hormuz today.

Today, the navigation crisis in the strait has an even greater impact than in those 20th-century wars, because it occurs in a global economy, where even minor disruptions in supply chains affect people far beyond the battlefield. Global energy markets are more integrated than they were during earlier maritime conflicts, and even a single shipping corridor being interrupted can ripple through supply chains, affecting dozens of economies. In the case of the strait, disruptions of shipping directly implicate neutral states that depend on the route for energy imports and trade. Major importers in Asia and Europe, as well as developing economies reliant on fuel shipments, can experience supply shocks even when they are not parties to the conflict. These disruptions translate into higher fuel and food prices, with downstream effects on civilian populations far from the battlefield, particularly in energy-importing states, such as major oil importers in Asia (China, India, South Korea, and Japan), as nearly 90 percent of the strait’s oil flows to Asian markets. 

Attacks in the strait are also part of a broader campaign of economic warfare in the conflict, as both sides target energy infrastructure in an attempt to maximize the costs of continuing the war. The U.S. and Israel have struck Iranian oil depots, refineries, and fuel storage facilities. Meanwhile, Iran has targeted civilian infrastructure and transport routes across the Persian Gulf, including commercial ships. It has struck fuel storage tanks and oil facilities in Fujairah and other locations in the United Arab Emirates and at the Salalah port in Oman. None of these pressure points, however, compares to the strait’s strategic leverage over the world’s oil trade, with nearly one-fifth of globally consumed petroleum liquids traveling through it.

The attacks are clear-cut instances of “economic warfare,” using military means to disrupt commerce to weaken the adversary’s will to fight, by both sides. So far, international humanitarian law has never fully prohibited economic warfare, and classic naval warfare doctrine, as reflected in the 1994 San Remo Manual, a highly influential nonbinding restatement of treaty and customary international law governing armed conflict at sea, permits blockade as a lawful method of war if it meets certain criteria. But the situation in the strait raises a deeper question: whether these doctrines—developed largely in an earlier era of maritime conflict—are capable of addressing the modern forms of economic warfare that can disrupt global markets rather than merely weaken an adversary’s ports or trade. 

The Transit Passage Regime

The first instrument relevant to whether Iran can close the strait under international law is the law of the sea, largely codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Part III of the treaty, particularly Articles 37 through 44, governing “Straits used for international navigation,” holds that all ships and aircraft have a right of transit passage, “which shall not be impeded,” and that “there shall be no suspension of transit passage” through a strait. The logic is that when much of global trade depends on a narrow corridor, the bordering states are not allowed to use that corridor as leverage.

The Strait of Hormuz is generally seen as one such “international strait.” It is so narrow that large ships must pass through the border states’ territorial waters. The strait essentially operates like a highway, with shipping organized through a traffic separation scheme created by the International Maritime Organization. Major maritime powers have also restated their commitment to leave transit passages unimpeded in their own operational-law restatements, which are nonbinding military manuals that interpret and apply international law to real-world operations, such as the U.S. Navy Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations or Germany’s Law of Armed Conflict Manual. 

Iran signed the UNCLOS in 1982 but never ratified the treaty. When it signed, the Iranian government declared that certain parts of the UNCLOS, including its transit passage, were “quid pro quo” bargains for treaty parties, rather than codifications of existing customary international law. Iran interprets itself as not being bound by the aforementioned “transit passage” regime, which Iran has codified into its own domestic laws. For example, a 1993 law, “Law of Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea,” allows Iran to suspend the passage of foreign ships in its territorial waters and requires prior authorization for the passage of warships, submarines, and vessels carrying “dangerous or harmful materials with respect to the protection of the environment.” This latter category can encompass commercial oil tankers, which carry bulk petroleum and are widely treated in maritime law as posing environmental and navigational risks. As a result, both foreign naval vessels and commercial energy shipments transiting the strait fall within categories that Iran claims authority to regulate.

Iran is not alone in asserting legal rights broader than what the UNCLOS provides. Oman, for example, which sits on the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz, is a party to the UNCLOS but has made similar declarations requiring warships to seek “prior permission” to pass through its territorial waters.

But the UNCLOS is not the full story. Even before the UNCLOS, international law considered certain straits as special from ordinary territorial waters. Notably, in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice rejected Albania’s attempt to require authorization from the United Kingdom prior to when its warships moved through the Corfu Channel, which overlaps with Albania’s territorial waters. The court held that when a strait between two parts of the high seas is used for international navigation, ships enjoy unrestricted passage during peacetime, so long as the transit does not threaten a coastal state’s security. Coastal states may take steps to prevent this passage only in exceptional circumstances. The Corfu decision laid the foundation for the later transit passage framework, which reaffirmed that straits that are essential to international navigation should remain open. Today, many international law scholars and states argue that the transit passage regime is part of customary law.

Major maritime powers have tracked coastal-state claims over passage waters and challenged them as contrary to international law. For instance, the U.S. Freedom of Navigation program, through which the United States challenges excessive maritime claims, treats the UNCLOS transit passage regime as reflective of customary international law, even though the United States itself has not ratified the treaty. The program lists both Iranian and Omani restrictions as “excessive maritime claims,” conducting naval operations, known as freedom of navigation operations. By navigating the strait under the transit passage regime, the U.S. is making operational assertions against Iran’s rejection of the transit passage regime, generating state practice to crystallize the regime into customary international law.

Self-Defense Regime and the Law of Naval Warfare

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows a state to act in self-defense “if an armed attack occurs,” Iran can make a self-defense claim to justify its attacks in the strait. The law of self-defense is protected at sea through instruments such as the San Remo Manual. Iran has not consistently framed its actions in terms of referring to a legal regime but instead uses rhetoric and bluster to assert control over the strait and use that control as leverage in the current war.

However, Iran can argue that any actions to close the strait are taken in self-defense. But these self-defense claims come with their own restrictions under international law. The action taken in self-defense must be necessary to repel the armed attack and proportional to the threat. Additionally, states must ensure they do not target civilian objects or civilians—a provision with which Iran does not comply when it attacks commercial oil vessels and other civilian ships.

The effects of closing the strait, however, are not limited to the attacking state, in this case, the U.S., which raises the question of the closure’s proportionality. Article 51 defines proportionality as the force reasonably required to repel or prevent further attacks by the aggressor. This force calculation focuses on both the attacking and defending states. Here, the effects will largely reverberate past the attacking state and onto third parties, creating a doctrinal gap. 

International law provides other doctrines that partially address the problem. The law of naval warfare—reflected in frameworks such as the 1907 Hague Convention XIII and the San Remo Manual—allows for blockades as tools of economic warfare, but conditions this on certain requirements, including a formal declaration, notifying other states, enforcing to the degree that it is actually effective (which is difficult because prolonged closure would probably trigger countermeasures by other naval powers), and applying it impartially to all vessels. These principles have been largely reemphasized in the 2023 Newport Manual, a nonbinding but influential restatement of customary international law on naval warfare, which builds on the San Remo Manual. The Newport Manual largely restates the San Remo framework while highlighting the obligation to protect neutral shipping and avoid undue interference with international navigation—requirements that are increasingly difficult to reconcile with large-scale economic warfare in maritime chokepoints. 

Additionally, the blockade cannot impede neutral states from reaching their own ports or coastlines. Note that not all modern states, including Iran, Israel, and Oman, are party to Hague Convention XIII, but its rules are generally codified in customary international law instruments such as the San Remo Manual. Given that Iran is indiscriminately restricting access to the strait—and therefore restricting access to neutral coastlines—it is likely violating that rule.

Legality of Measures That Would “Close” the Strait

The primary way by which Iran can “close” the strait is to attack ships passing through it to deter other ships from attempting to pass. 

If Iran engages in mine warfare on the strait, it may run into complications under international law. The 1907 Hague Convention on mines prohibits states from laying mines “with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping” and requires precautions to protect peaceful shipments. Although not all states, including Iran, are parties to the Hague Convention, many of its rules are widely regarded as reflecting the customary principles that govern mine warfare. Customary international law restatements, written by international law scholars and naval practitioners, also emphasize that the state laying the mines must take due regard of neutral shipping, by “inter alia, providing safe alternative routes for shipping of neutral States,” and prohibit impeding transit through international straits unless safe and convenient alternatives exist.

The Strait of Hormuz’s geography, however, means that a meaningful alternative safe shipping route is impossible. Oil could reach the Red Sea but only through limited-capacity pipelines rather than an equivalent sea route. Furthermore, even these partial alternatives are fragile: shipping routes through the Red Sea have been obstructed by attacks from Iran-backed actors in previous conflicts, including the Houthis, and these attacks are likely to recur in the current war. Acting through proxies also does not insulate Iran; it may instead increase the state’s international legal exposure by extending economic warfare to additional chokepoints and neutral shipping.

Iran has so far enforced the closure by attacking oil tankers. Under the law of naval warfare, as reflected in customary international law and restated in the San Remo Manual, neutral merchant vessels generally have protection from attacks unless they meet certain conditions, such as engaging in belligerent acts, refusing to stop after a warning, or carrying contraband, which can either be absolute contraband, including inherently military objects like weapons, or conditional contraband that are civilian goods that could have military use. Even if the merchant vessels belong to the adversarial state, the ships are targetable only if they qualify as military objectives as defined in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the 1977 Geneva Conventions. By default, merchant vessels are presumed to be civilian objects, unless shown otherwise. The point of these international agreements is to prevent naval warfare from becoming a string of indiscriminate attacks against civilian commerce.

Where Does This Leave the Strait of Hormuz Today?

There are three legal regimes vying for supremacy in the case of the strait. The UNCLOS’s transit passage regime is supposed to keep such chokepoints open. The law of naval warfare, as reflected in the Hague conventions and customary international law, allows a blockade, but only under certain conditions that are likely difficult for Iran to fulfill. Finally, self-defense, established by the UN Charter, is another option for Iran, but it comes with limitations on both the targets and the scale of force used.

Iran can continue to pursue economic warfare in Hormuz—mining the strait, declaring exclusion zones, or striking neutral tankers—but it exposes itself to international legal vulnerability. Even if Iran relies on the self-defense doctrine, contestably its strongest argument, the scale of third-party harm and the legal protections surrounding international straits would likely make a broad closure of the strait legally impermissible. 

Previously, the three doctrines could work together because naval warfare was more geographically limited and directed primarily at enemy ports. Blockades were imposed against clearly identifiable belligerents, and neutral shipping vessels could often avoid contested waters. Today, however, hostilities in a chokepoint such as the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate tensions between the governing legal regimes: The transit passage legal regime assumes uninterrupted navigation through international straits, while the law of naval warfare permits interference with shipping during armed conflict. At the same time, the law of self-defense evaluates proportionality in relation to the adversary state, even though disrupting a chokepoint can impose economic costs on dozens of neutral countries that depend on the route.

International maritime law, despite its many rules, is not equipped for today’s globalized world and chokepoints. While the current article focuses on the Strait of Hormuz, the issue is much broader and can repeat in locations such as the Strait of Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, or the Danish Straits. The issue is not simply whether particular actions in the strait violate existing international law, but whether the legal architecture governing maritime conflict is capable of regulating economic warfare in a deeply interconnected global economy.

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[Repost] International Women’s Day statement by Women’s Peace Network

10 March 2026

This International Women’s Day, we reexpress our commitment to our fellow women in Myanmar and across the world, as well as our urgent calls for protection, relief, and justice.

Over five years after its attempted coup, the Burmese military has arbitrarily arrested and detained over 6,300 women, and exposed them to torture and sexual violence in detention centers and prisons. Even after conducting its sham election, the military has continued to intensify its air, drone, and ground attacks on civilians and civilian properties; since February 2021, the military’s armed attacks have disproportionately injured and killed over 2000 women. Surviving women continue to be exposed to the military’s forced recruitment and its decades-long use of rape as a weapon of war.

The widespread nature of this crime extends to Rakhine State, where the Burmese military and Arakan Army are continuing to target Rohingya women in an attempt to ethnically cleanse them from their homelands. From Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, reports are increasingly emerging of the AA’s sexual violence and forced recruitment of Rohingya girls. The AA is committing these crimes as its soldiers pillage Rohingya villages, forcibly transfer its residents, and disappear and murder them. 

There is no end in sight to the ongoing catastrophe, one that has now emboldened some of our revolutionary allies to brutalize our fellow women with impunity. Over the past year, cases of torture and sexual violence against women by resistance forces have been reported in conflict areas, including Mandalay and Sagaing regions. Most recently, in the latter’s Yinmabin District, officials of the area’s 20th Battalion deliberately beat and raped a Muslim woman for her minority faith, and threatened her family members. 

In addition to its atrocity conditions, the country’s widespread lack of humanitarian access further exposes women to lethal conditions and mass displacement. In 2025, more than half of the Rohingya forced to flee on boats were women and children embarking from Myanmar. Even in exile, women continue to face deteriorating livelihood and protection challenges as refugees in Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and across South and Southeast Asia.

Therefore, this International Women’s Day, we urge the international community to actively support women-led civil society in ending the ongoing crisis. Immediate actions must be taken to end its root causes, especially by holding accountable the Burmese military, and all other perpetrators of sexual violence.

At the same time, the National Unity Government and resistance forces must immediately investigate cases of sexual violence within their organization, hold their perpetrators accountable, and implement victim and survivor-centered measures to prevent the recurrence of this heinous crime. Comprehensive safety and protection will enable us and our fellow diverse women to fully and effectively contribute to the Spring Revolution and Myanmar’s peaceful and inclusive federal democracy.

The time to act is now. In Myanmar and beyond, the world must work with us and our fellow women in paving our unique lives and futures.

Please click here for a PDF copy of the statement.

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[Repost] ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in the Middle East

5 March 2026

4 March 2026

  1. We follow closely the situation and express serious concern over the escalation of conflict in the Middle East following the attacks initiated by Israel and the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran on 28 February 2026 and the subsequent retaliatory attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against several countries in the region, including the Kingdom of Bahrain, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, State of Kuwait, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Arab Emirates, which continue to heighten tensions in the Middle East, and pose a grave threat to the lives and safety of civilians, as well as to regional and global peace and stability. We call on all countries to respect international law, including the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter).
  2. This escalation is particularly regrettable as it occurred amid ongoing diplomatic efforts, including mediation initiatives led by the Sultanate of Oman aimed at advancing a negotiated solution.

Download the full statement here.

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[Repost] Five years since the Burmese military’s attempted coup in Myanmar

2 February 2026

Today marks five years since the Burmese military’s violent overthrow of an elected government in Myanmar, and subsequent commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide against our fellow people.

The military’s atrocities – including air and drone strikes, arbitrary arrest and detention, mass killing, sexual and gender-based violence – have forced millions of civilians to become internally displaced persons in areas of armed conflict and famine, or refugees in life-threatening conditions of exile over land and sea.

We strongly reject the military’s recent sham election, which will only embolden its forces to intensify its campaign of terror across the country. Even during its so-called election period, in just weeks, the military murdered over 170 civilians with its airstrikes. This month, at the International Court of Justice’s public hearings on The Gambia v. Myanmar case, the military publicly denied its genocide against the Rohingya and the Rohingya identity.

We urge the international community to hold the Burmese military accountable for international crimes. Holding the key agent of Myanmar’s catastrophe will help end the country’s decades-long impunity, which is now being exercised by the Arakan Army to ethnically cleanse Rakhine State of the Rohingya. Myanmar’s future must rest on the rule of law, equality, and fundamental freedoms of all of the country’s diverse peoples.

At the same time, we call for immediate protection and relief to all civilians in Myanmar. The international community must enable cross-border aid via credible actors to Myanmar, as well as comprehensive support to women-led groups and other local civil society. 

We urge the international community to join our brave people’s resistance against authoritarianism, dictatorship, patriarchy, and all other forms of oppression.

WOMEN’S PEACE NETWORK

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[Repost] Myanmar begins defence in landmark genocide case at UN World Court

20 January 2026

https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2026/01/114937/myanmar-begins-defence-landmark-genocide-case-un-world-court

Myanmar on Friday rejected allegations of genocide against the Rohingya minority, telling the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the Gambia’s case rests on “unsubstantiated allegations,” as public hearings continued in a landmark case on the application of the Genocide Convention.

Addressing judges in The Hague, Ko Ko Hlaing, speaking as Myanmar’s agent, said his country fully recognizes the importance of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide but firmly denies breaching its obligations under international law.

“A finding of genocide would place an indelible stain on my country and its people,” he said, describing the proceedings as “of fundamental importance for my country’s reputation and future.”

Mr. Hlaing accused the applicant of relying on what he called rudimentary and partisan, including reports by a fact-finding mission, “which are neither reliable nor objective, and were a condemnation without trial of Myanmar.”

Myanmar acted against terrorists

Myanmar also rejected claims that its military’s so-called “clearance operations” in northern Rakhine state in 2016 and 2017 were genocidal in intent, maintaining they were counter-terrorism operations launched in response to attacks by the armed groups.

“Obviously, Myanmar was not obliged to remain idle and allow terrorists to have free rein of northern Rakhine state,” Mr. Hlaing told the Court, while acknowledging that civilians were killed and large numbers of people fled to Bangladesh as a result of the clashes.

He further disputed allegations that Myanmar denies the existence or rights of the Muslim population in northern Rakhine state, arguing that questions of citizenship, terminology and identity “have nothing to do with genocide.”

Myanmar said it has complied with all procedural orders of the Court, including provisional measures issued in January 2020, and has submitted regular reports on steps taken.

It also reiterated its stated commitment to the repatriation of displaced people from Bangladesh, citing bilateral agreements and delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters.

The case before the ICJ

The case stems from an application filed by Gambia in November 2019, accusing Myanmar of violating the Genocide Convention through acts allegedly committed during military operations in Rakhine state.

Those operations escalated in 2017, forcing more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh amid widespread killings, sexual violence and village burnings, according to UN investigations. Nearly one million Rohingya remain refugees in Bangladesh.

The hearings, which will continue through late January, mark the first time the Court is examining the merits of the case. The Court’s final judgment, which could take months after the hearings conclude, will be legally binding.

Source URL 

Myanmar begins defence in landmark genocide case at UN World Court

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[Statement] Ongoing Human Rights Crisis in Venezuela and the Capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro

5 January 2026

MARUAH is deeply disconcerted by the organised military attack on 3 January 2026 by the United States of America (“America”, or the “US”) on Venezuela. We are also deeply concerned over the American capture of Nicolás Maduro, the sitting president of Venezuela, to stand trial in America. These actions in all likelihood constitute violations of international law, including the UN Charter as well as America’s own Constitution as shown in expressed concerns within Congress. We are disturbed by the expressed intentions of America to run Venezuela and to control its oil resources. 

As a human rights organisation we condemn the approach, intentions and actions taken by the US as these are violations which can also dangerously disrupt national, regional and international peace and security, jeopardise commitments to the rules-based international order and most importantly endanger civil population. This attack has killed and injured a number of Venezuelans.

We call upon the international community to consider this attack as a human rights violation and to show support to the people in this aftermath by prioritizing protection of human dignity, restoration of democratic rights and provision of humanitarian support. The Venezuelan people have already, for years, endured much suffering from widespread violence, repression and severe economic hardship.

We hope that changes to Venezuela’s political situation will lead to an end of human rights abuses and ensure protection for the people. We urge the international community to work together in addressing the urgent needs of Venezuelans that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)) and to ensure that everyone, in due course, “has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” (Article 21 of the UDHR).

We hope that Venezuelan President Maduro, like any individual, will be tried fairly and impartially by an independent and impartial tribunal. The recent events, without due process or international consensus, can dangerously set a wrong precedent on how political leaders are to be held accountable. We reiterate that “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him” (Article 10 of the UDHR).

MARUAH stands in solidarity with the people of Venezuela.

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[Repost] Report: “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime” by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 (A/80/492)

29 October 2025

20 October 2025

https://www.un.org/unispal/document/special-rapporteur-report-gaza-genocide-a-collective-crime-20oct25/

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese

Gaza Genocide: a collective crime

Summary:

The ongoing genocide in Gaza is a collective crime, sustained by the complicity of influential Third States that have enabled longstanding systemic violations of international law by Israel. Framed by colonial narratives that dehumanize the Palestinians, this live- streamed atrocity has been facilitated through Third States’ direct support, material aid, diplomatic protection and, in some cases, active participation. It has exposed an unprecedented chasm between peoples and their governments, betraying the trust on which global peace and security rest. The world now stands on a knife-edge between the collapse of the international rule of law and hope for renewal. Renewal is only possible if complicity is confronted, responsibilities are met and justice is upheld.

I. Introduction:

  1. Without the direct participation, aid and assistance of other States, the prolonged unlawful Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory, which has now escalated into a full- fledged genocide, could not have been sustained. The military, political and economic support of some Third States and the unwillingness to hold Israel accountable has enabled Israel to embed its regime of settler-colonial apartheid in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), with more colonies, home demolitions, restrictions on movement and loss and erasure of Palestinian life. Since October 2023, Israel has escalated its violence to an unprecedented level.
  2. In light of this complicity, this report demonstrates that the ongoing genocide of the Palestinians must be understood as an internationally enabled crime. Many States, primarily Western ones, have facilitated, legitimized and eventually normalized the genocidal campaign perpetrated by Israel. By portraying Palestinian civilians as “human shields” and the broader onslaught in Gaza as a battle of civilization against barbarism, they have reproduced the Israeli distortions of international law and colonial tropes, seeking to justify their own complicity in genocide.
  3. Focusing on the aid and assistance that Third States have provided to the illegal Israeli occupation and its genocide of the Palestinian people, the report identifies four sectors of support: diplomatic, military, economic and “humanitarian”. Each is indispensable to the ongoing Israeli violations of international law. Diplomatic initiatives have normalized the Israeli occupation and failed to achieve a permanent ceasefire. Large-scale military aid, cooperation and arms transfers, primarily to and from the United States and European States, have enabled Israeli domination over the Palestinian people. This has also facilitated Israeli actions to dismantle humanitarian aid and impose conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of Palestinians as a group. Economic cooperation has fuelled the Israeli economy, which has profited from the illegal occupation and genocide.
  4. The successful measures implemented against Apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia, Portugal and other colonial regimes demonstrate that international law can be enforced to secure justice and self-determination. Today, Third States have the same legal and moral obligation to apply these and other measures against any State still perpetrating settler- colonial violence and apartheid. Their failure to hold Israel accountable for its long-standing international crimes – despite clear orders from international courts – exposes the flagrant double standards of the international community.

II. Methodology

  1. The report was developed through a review of UN materials, including the report of the Secretary General A/79/588 and 40 submissions from State and non-State actors. All 63 States mentioned in the report were provided the opportunity to comment on factual errors or inaccuracies; 18 States submitted a reply.

III. Legal Framework

  1. International law imposes a range of obligations on all States to respect, prevent and bring an end to violations whenever they occur. In the context of the oPt, the most relevant are:

(a) Direct obligations all States owe to the Palestinian people – especially the obligations to respect their right to self-determination and freedom from apartheid and genocide – and to the State of Palestine, while respecting the principles of non-interference, territorial integrity, political independence and self-defence.

(b) Obligations erga omnes arising from the serious breach of peremptory norms – the obligation to respect the self-determination of the people, the prohibition of genocide, racial segregation, apartheid and territorial acquisition through force by Israel, including: (i) a positive obligation to, individually and cooperatively, bring any unlawful situation to an end through lawful means; and negative duties to not (ii) recognize as lawful the situation arising from their breach, or (iii) render aid or assistance to maintain that situation.

(c) Obligations of due diligence to prevent specific violations of international law, including the obligations to: (i) prevent genocide (triggered when a “serious risk” arises); (ii) ensure respect for international humanitarian law (triggered when violations are “likely or foreseeable”) and (iii) cooperate to prevent crimes and attacks on internationally protected persons.

(d) Obligations to refrain from aiding or assisting, or directly participating in internationally wrongful acts of other States, including aggression, apartheid and

7. While international law does not prescribe the specific actions that Third States must take to discharge their obligations, certain obligations are assessed according to results. Where these obligations are duties of conduct, State responsibility depends on the circumstances involved, gravity of the violations in question, level of influence over the violating State and the means available to exert such influence. A State fails in its obligation if it does not use all available means to discharge it.

8. Certain areas of international law do specify the means available to States and the opinio juris regarding expected actions, which are relevant to assessing Third State compliance with their obligations. These include:

(a) Forcible measures: Third States may, and in some case must, use force against a State in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, in at least three circumstances:

(i) under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Third States may intervene on request of a State acting in self-defence when subject to an act of aggression; (ii) pursuant to a UNSC Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (iii) under the Uniting for Peace resolution.

(b) Arms embargoes: the Arms Trade Treaty prohibits arms and other military- related transfers when it is known or should have been known that the goods will be used in international crimes. It also requires risk assessments to prevent transfers where there are overriding risks to international peace and security or of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian Prohibitions also apply to transit and trans-shipment.

(c) Trade embargoes: treaties under the World Trade Organization allow States to deviate from core trade principles, such as Most Favoured Nation, to fulfil their UN Charter obligations relating to international peace and security, including peremptory norms. Bilateral free trade and investment agreements with Israel usually contain similar clauses, and human rights arguments have been upheld in international arbitration. To the extent that bilateral agreements violate peremptory norms or sustain their serious breach, they are null and void.

(d) Denial of Safe Passage: the Convention on the Law of the Sea allows States to prevent “non-innocent passage” where a ship’s passage is not “in conformity with the rules of international law”, and risks rendering the State complicit in international crimes, violations of UN Charter obligations or peremptory norms.

(e) Prosecution and Punishment: under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, all States have the obligation to prosecute and punish genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, regardless of their connection to the Third States also have obligations to hold third parties, including corporations, to account for human rights and other violations of international law in their domestic courts.

9. A context of sustained and intersecting peremptory norms’ violations, and the obligation to prevent genocide, compound the imperative to It may mean that the actions Third States must take to fulfil their obligations are no longer discretionary, and that in not taking them, States have failed to take all measures reasonably available to them and/or they have aided and assisted in an internationally wrongful act. That is, unless less intrusive measures based on the assessment in paragraph 8 would truly suffice.

10. The conduct of States and international organizations constitutes complicity when their actions aid and assist in a way that: (1) materially or substantially enables or facilitates the commission of the wrongful act; (2) are done with full knowledge of the circumstances, including the imminent or actual occurrence of the wrongful act and, where relevant, the special intent of the perpetrator.

11. State complicity is established when there is a nexus between the actions of the two States in question in the serious breach of peremptory norms. Such complicity may involve extent that bilateral agreements violate peremptory norms or sustain their serious breach, they are null and void.

(d) Denial of Safe Passage: the Convention on the Law of the Sea allows States to prevent “non-innocent passage” where a ship’s passage is not “in conformity with the rules of international law”, and risks rendering the State complicit in international crimes, violations of UN Charter obligations or peremptory norms.

(e) Prosecution and Punishment: under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, all States have the obligation to prosecute and punish genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, regardless of their connection to the Third States also have obligations to hold third parties, including corporations, to account for human rights and other violations of international law in their domestic courts.

9. A context of sustained and intersecting peremptory norms’ violations, and the obligation to prevent genocide, compound the imperative to It may mean that the actions Third States must take to fulfil their obligations are no longer discretionary, and that in not taking them, States have failed to take all measures reasonably available to them and/or they have aided and assisted in an internationally wrongful act. That is, unless less intrusive measures based on the assessment in paragraph 8 would truly suffice.

10. The conduct of States and international organizations constitutes complicity when their actions aid and assist in a way that: (1) materially or substantially enables or facilitates the commission of the wrongful act; (2) are done with full knowledge of the circumstances, including the imminent or actual occurrence of the wrongful act and, where relevant, the special intent of the perpetrator.

11. State complicity is established when there is a nexus between the actions of the two States in question in the serious breach of peremptory norms, Such complicity may involve the provision or denial of funds, weapons, fuel, intelligence, diplomatic or political pressure or sanctions, or the implementation of orders and arrest warrants. The intention of a Third State to facilitate a wrongful act is reasonably inferrable from the foreseeable consequences of that State’s actions. Assistance such as the provision of funds, weapons, fuel and intelligence and other less tangible actions (diplomatic recognition, sanctions, non- implementation of obligations and of court orders) can substantially influence States committing internationally wrongful acts. Knowledge of a State’s policies, including through official relationships, may inform relevant inference. While individual actions may not constitute complicity in themselves, their aggregate and cumulative effect over time, including when combined with the actions of other States, must be considered as part of the assessment.

12. When the conduct of Third States is direct, indispensable and constitutive (i.e., without it, the result would have not occurred in whole or in part), it must be considered whether States have gone beyond aid and/or assistance to jointly participate in an internationally wrongful act. As with a joint criminal enterprise under individual criminal responsibility, it is unnecessary to establish that one State performs the wrongful act in its entirety, only that their contribution is a constituent element of the crime and attributable to the State. Direct State responsibility for genocide may arise when (a) conduct attributable to a State is integral to the commission of one or more genocidal acts, and (b) the State formed genocidal intent based on the totality of conduct attributable to it.

13. Israeli violations in the occupied territory have been established for decades. By 2004, in its Wall Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) placed the international community on notice of its obligations to end serious violations of peremptory norms of international law. By 6 October 2023, Israel had long denied the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination through occupation, annexation and unlawful use of force, maintaining control over Palestinian lives through a racially discriminatory and apartheid system. The illegal blockade of Gaza, compounded by regular military attacks involving war crimes and crimes against humanity, had made the Gaza Strip “unliveable”, priming the situation for genocide.

14. In the last two years, Israeli crimes have dramatically By 20 October 2023, international law experts, genocide scholars and human rights organizations had warned of impending genocide. On 26 January 2024, the ICJ confirmed the serious risk of genocide in Gaza, giving rise to States obligations to prevent it and to punish incitement, commission or complicity. By May 2024, the Court had issued two further Provisional Measures orders and made judicial comments in Nicaragua v Germany, the ICC Prosecutor had sought arrest warrants for senior Israeli officials, and Third States had “actual or constructive knowledge” of the ongoing international crimes they had failed to prevent, triggering a heightened responsibility to act.

15. In July 2024, 20 years after its 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ determined the illegality of the continued presence of Israel in the oPt in its entirety and the obligation of Israel to withdraw totally, unconditionally and as rapidly as possible. The UN General Assembly subsequently declared that the occupation must be dismantled by 18 September 2025. Israel has failed to do so.

16. On 16 September 2025, the UN Commission of Inquiry concluded that Israel is committing genocide in the Gaza Strip, reaffirming the obligations of all States to prevent genocide, to cease committing and/or aiding and assisting genocide and punish those perpetrating and/or inciting genocide.

17. These developments confirm the seriousness of the breaches of peremptory norms involved and the concomitant legal obligations on all States to act, with two implications for the assessment of Third State responsibility:

(a) Intersecting duties must be assessed holistically and create an imperative on all States to take measures, including those outlined in paragraph 8 in order to discharge their

(b) Under existing law, the extent of Israel’s unlawful actions renders any distinction between Israel and the oPt legally and practically impossible. According to the due diligence tests outlined in the 2024 Advisory Opinion, if Israel itself is unwilling or unable to distinguish between its territory and the oPt, as is the case, Third States must presume indistinguishability, which requires a comprehensive boycott of Israel.

18. In the context of protracted aggression, denial of self-determination and heinous international crimes, there can be no reasonable doubt that States that maintain relations with Israel have knowledge of Decades of neglect by Third States and non-adherence to their obligations has created the conditions for their complicity in ongoing Israeli crimes. The following sections analyse Third States’ violations holistically, examining the link between intersecting components of genocide and States’ conduct.

IV. Intersecting Components of the Gaza Genocide

A. Genocide Under the Guise of Diplomatic and Political Actions

19. Prolonged political and diplomatic support by influential Third States has enabled Israel to initiate and sustain its assault on the Palestinian people. In the past two years, entrenched complicity, marked by narrative manipulations and reproduction of Israeli fabrications, have muted the urgent calls for action and obscured the web of political, financial and military interests at play. The longstanding failure to address egregious violations of international law by Israel – threatening international peace and security – has normalized and deepened relations with it, entrenching oppression, domination and erasure.

20. Following 7 October 2023, most Western leaders parroted Israeli narratives, disseminated by State and corporate media, repeating debunked claims and erasing core distinctions between combatants and civilians. Israelis were depicted as “civilians” and “hostages”, and Palestinians as “Hamas terrorists”, “legitimate” or “collateral” targets, “human shields” or lawfully detained “prisoners”. Drawing on a long history of the “savage” denied protections of international law, revived by the War on Terror discourse, Western States helped to justify the genocide against Palestinians. On 9 October 2023, immediately after Israel announced a tightened siege on Gaza, key Western leaders expressed support for the “self-defence” of Israel – unwarranted under article 51 of the UN Charter. President Biden repeatedly cited unsubstantiated reports of “beheaded babies”. British opposition Leader Keir Starmer defended Israel’s right to cut off water and power to civilians.

21. This environment fuelled a ferocious Israeli assault. Even amidst urgent calls for a ceasefire, Western states, led by the United States, advocated only for humanitarian “corridors”, “pauses” and “truces” – sidestepping a permanent ceasefire and ensuring a continuation of the violence. States reverted to treating the situation as a humanitarian crisis to be managed, rather than resolved, by demanding that Israel end its unlawful occupation once and for all, providing further leeway to the assault on Gaza.

22. Post-October 2023, the United States used its veto power in the UN Security Council seven times, controlling ceasefire negotiations and providing diplomatic cover for the Israeli genocide. The US has not acted alone. Abstentions, delays, watered-down draft resolutions and a simplistic rhetoric of “balance” reinforced the diplomatic protection and political narrative Israel required to continue the The United Kingdom maintained alignment with the US position until November 2024. A bloc of Western states – Australia, New Zealand and Canada, sometimes joined by the UK, Germany or the Netherlands – appeared at times ready to pressurize Israel, such as in December 2023, when their statements added momentum for a ceasefire. Yet their introduction of the term “sustained ceasefire” produced a diluted UNSC resolution that delayed action. In February 2024, they criticized the planned invasion of Rafah while simultaneously withdrawing United Nations Relief Words Agency (UNRWA) funding. Such diplomacy created an illusion of progress while concrete actions were repeatedly stymied.

23. Sanctions served a similar In 2024, Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand and the UK sanctioned some extremist settlers and organizations, and in June 2025, Israeli Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich were sanctioned by Australia, Canada, Norway and the UK. Yet such isolated actions effectively condone the Israeli state system and structures as a whole.

24. Arab and Muslim states have long supported the Palestinian Three joint Arab- Islamic summits and several extraordinary meetings on Palestine, generated some collective efforts, including the Arab Plan. Nevertheless, these actions have not been decisive, even amid Israeli aggression against six Arab States, reflecting the complexity of regional geopolitics. Normalization through the US-brokered Abraham Accords has also shifted economic incentives. Open sources report that influential States in the region facilitated land routes to Israel, bypassing the Red Sea. While Qatar and Egypt sought to broker ceasefire agreements, Qatar hosts the largest US military base in the region, and Egypt maintained significant security and economic relations with Israel, including energy cooperation and the closing of the Rafah crossing.

25. Certain non-Western States have turned to international courts to seek accountability and pressurize Israel to cease its actions. While only 13 States have supported South Africa before the ICJ, most Western States have persistently denied genocide. None have joined Nicaragua against Germany at the ICJ, or invoked domestic laws against complicit corporations or individuals. Only seven referred the situation to the ICC, many sought to undermine its arrest warrants, and at least 37 States were non-committal or critical, signalling intent to evade arrest obligations. The United States imposed sanctions to paralyse the Court; the United Kingdom threatened its funding, while Prime Minister Netanyahu travelled freely across European airspace, even visiting Hungary, which withdrew from the Court in April 2025.

26. Israel has been sheltered from accountability in courts as well as in global fora, with institutions preventing its deserved expulsion both from sports (e.g., Paris Olympics, FIFA World Cup qualifiers, FIBA, Davis Cup) and cultural events (Eurovision, Venice Biennale).

27. The ICJ’s groundbreaking ruling on the illegality of the occupation has yet to bring change. On 18 September 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/24, reaffirming the binding nature of the Court’s legal obligations and formulating a roadmap to end the occupation by 17 September 2025 through diplomatic, economic and legal measures which states have yet to implement.

28. The Saudi–French Two-State Solution Conference of September 2025 led to ten new States recognizing the State of Palestine. While an important step, these tardy recognitions have so far remained symbolic, with no tangible effect in addressing the ongoing genocide. Overall, 20 new states have issued recognitions of the State of Palestine since October 2023, but with restrictive conditions (e.g., concerning governance, territorial integrity, political independence and demilitarization) incompatible with the very essence of self- determination, effectively reproducing forms of colonial tutelage.

29. Since October 2023, only Belize, Bolivia, Colombia and Nicaragua have suspended diplomatic relations with Israel, and only six States – Bahrain, Chad, Chile, Honduras, Jordan, Türkiye and South Africa – have downgraded their relations with Israel.

30. The most notable effort has come from the Hague Group initiative launched in January 2025. Led by Colombia and South Africa, 13 States of the Global Majority have committed to enforce six concrete measures against Israel. Twenty-one other States joined the third meeting of the Group in New York on the sidelines of the 80th Session of the General Assembly. Despite the efforts of some of its members, Israel still holds its UN credentials.

31. On 30 September 2025, many States, including Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the UAE, endorsed the “Trump Plan”, despite its silence on ending the occupation, ensuring accountability, providing transitional justice and its imposition of a temporary mechanism of imperial foreign governance for Gaza that further undermines, rather than realizes, Palestinian self-determination.

B. Military Ties: providing the means of destruction

32. While UN resolutions have called for arms embargoes on Israel since 1976, many States have continued supplying it with military support and arms transfers. Israel is disproportionately dependent on weapons imports, with the proportion of their total trade more than double the OECD average, and over four times greater than that of the United States. This international supply has continued, even as the evidence of genocide has mounted, with the United States, Germany and Italy among the largest suppliers. Only a few Western States, notably Spain and Slovenia, have cancelled contracts and imposed embargoes.

33. The United States has financially and militarily supported Israel since its creation. Following the 1967 war, Israel became the leading recipient of US Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The 60-year strategic partnership between the United States and Israel has been underpinned by a legislated commitment to Israeli “Qualitative Military Edge”, almost 30 years of agreements ensuring Israeli–US military cooperation, a steady supply of military and economic aid to Israel and preferential access to US military sales. The third US–Israel MOU, effective until 2028, guarantees $3.3 billion/year in FMF plus $500 million/year for missile. The US has supplied arms to Israel through military sales – the US accounts for two-thirds of annual Israeli arms imports – and through access to the US weapons stockpile (WRSA-I) in Israel. Israel also has special permission to use FMF to purchase Israeli-made weapons. Meanwhile Israeli purchase of F-15, F-16 and F- 35 fighter jets and munitions is supported by access to procurement funds to Israeli subsidiaries in the US.

34. US political, diplomatic, military and strategic support to Israel has escalated after 7 October 2023. Senior US politicians and military officials engaged in unprecedented travel to Israel, including for operational discussions on Israeli military conduct in Gaza. On 20 October 2023, the Biden Administration announced it would request an additional $14.3 billion for Israel. In April 2024, this passed Congress as a $26.4 billion package for Israeli defence just as Israel threatened the Rafah invasion, previously a stated (but subsequently denied) “red line” for President Biden. Israel was later exempted from the Trump Administration freeze on military aid.

35. Since October 2023, the US has transferred 742 consignments of “arms and ammunition” (HS Code 93) and approved tens of billions in new sales. The Biden and Trump Administrations reduced transparency, accelerated transfers through repeated emergency approvals, facilitated Israeli access to US weapons stockpile held abroad and authorized hundreds of sales just below the amount requiring congressional. The US has deployed military aircraft, special forces and surveillance drones to Israel, with US surveillance purportedly being used to target Hamas, including in the first raid on Al Shifa hospital.

36. By September 2024, the US had reportedly supplied 57,000 artillery shells, 36,000 rounds of cannon ammunition, 20,000 M4A1 rifles, 13,981 anti-tank missiles and 8,700 MK- 82 500lb bombs. By April 2025, Israel had 751 active sales valued at $39.2 billion. Both the Biden and Trump Administrations have enabled this constant flow of weapons, except for a short pause in the delivery of 500lb and 2000lb bombs on the eve of the Israeli attack on Rafah in May 2024, which lasted until July 2024 for 500lb bombs and until January 2025 for 2000lb bombs.

37. Germany has been the second-largest arms exporter to Israel during the genocide, with supplies ranging from frigates to torpedoes. German leaders have justified this support based on its perceived post-Holocaust obligations to Israel. In addition to suspending ethical and legal assessments of the Israeli occupation, from October 2023 to July 2025, Germany issued individual export licences worth €489 million – 15 percent of all licences to Israel in 22 years. This does not include any arms transferred under collective licences or on a government-to-government basis. Although Chancellor Merz temporarily suspended future export approvals in August 2025, €2.46 million in exports were approved a month later.

38. The United Kingdom has also played a key role in military collaboration with Israel, despite internal opposition. From its bases in Cyprus, the UK has enabled a crucial US supply line to Tel Aviv and flown over 600 surveillance missions over Gaza throughout the genocide, sharing intelligence with Israel. Flight numbers and durations, often coinciding with major Israeli operations, suggest detailed knowledge and cooperation in the destruction of Gaza, extending beyond “hostage rescue”.

39. Other States have supplied parts, components and weapons to Israel through an opaque system that obscures transfers, including ‘dual use’ and indirect transfers. Between October 2023 and October 2025, 26 States sent at least 10 consignments of “arms and ammunition” (HS Code 93) to Israel, the most frequent being China, including Taiwan, India, Italy, Austria, Spain, Czechia, Romania and France. Military aircraft, land vehicles, drones, dogs and dual-use items such as integrated circuits are harder to track.

40. States also engage in indirect transfers by supplying components for arms used by Israel. The F-35 stealth strike fighter programme, key to the Israeli military assault in Gaza, involves 19 States – Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Romania, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States – supplying components and parts to Seventeen of them have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty. Despite litigation in the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Denmark and the United Kingdom – all of which defended their roles, and some cancellation of direct exports – States continue to transfer F-35 parts, heavily used in the genocidal destruction of Gaza.

41. States frequently deploy two arguments to justify arms trade with Israel: such arms are said to be either “defensive” or “non-lethal”. The Arms Trade Treaty does not recognize either distinction, but requires a holistic assessment of how all arms, parts and components will ultimately be used. Given that the occupation of Palestinian territory is an ongoing unlawful use of force in violation of the UN Charter, nothing Israel does there can be understood as “defensive” in nature.

42. States have continued to grant export licences for weapons to Israel, to review and partially retain licences despite acknowledging concerns (e.g., the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia) and to permit transfer of weapons through their ports and airports (e.g., Italy, Netherlands, Ireland, France, Morocco). Italy, the third largest exporter to Israel in 2020–2024, has argued that it complies with legal obligations to cease these exports, while continuing existing agreements and adopting a hands-off approach to transit. These actions, despite clear obligations and compounding concerns, indicate an intent to facilitate Israeli crimes.

43. States also support the Israeli military through military partnerships and joint defense manoeuvres. Since 2015, the Israeli Air Force has participated in the INIOCHOS exercise, including in 2025 alongside Greece, US, Italy, Qatar, UAE, France, Spain, Montenegro, India, Slovenia and Poland. In 2024–2025, Israel participated with 27 nations in the largest global exercise, led by AFRICOM (US Africa Command) and the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces. Israeli soldiers are trained at the UK Royal College of Defence Studies.190

44. In addition, thousands of citizens from the United States, Russia, France, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, among others, have served in the Israeli military since October 2023. Few have been investigated, and none prosecuted for crimes in Gaza.

45. Third States also continue to purchase Israeli weapons and military technology. Besides being a core component of its economy – in 2024 weapons exports accounted for 23 percent of Israeli exports, the second-highest share globally – these exports also enhance Israeli arms manufacturing capacity.

46. A unique selling point of Israeli military technology is that it is tested on Palestinians under occupation and related military activities. The ongoing genocide has enabled Israel to expand the range of weaponry and surveillance systems tested on the Gaza population. As a result, the value of arms exports increased by 18 percent during the genocide, with exports to the EU more than doubling and accounting for 54 percent of Israeli military exports in 2024. Other significant destinations include Asia and the Pacific (23 percent) and Arab countries under the Abraham Accords (12 percent).

C. Weaponization of aid: creating the living conditions for genocide

47. Some Third States have facilitated the degradation of living conditions of the Gaza population, including by the very means of their participation in the provision of aid.

48. Already, before 7 October, the illegal Gaza blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt – with severe restrictions on the movement of goods, even down to calculated caloric intake – had made 80 percent of the population aid-dependent, with 1 million relying on UNRWA for food and basic services. The agency is the bedrock of economic, social and humanitarian support for the Palestinians, especially in Gaza, its embeddedness in the local population allowing it to run more than 400 sites for aid distribution amid the genocide.

49. Since October 2023, Israel has turned existing restrictions into a full blockade. From October 2023 to January 2025, aid was limited to an average of 107 trucks per day – less than one third of pre-2023 levels.202 In March 2025, Israel further tightened its tightened its siege. By August 2025, famine in Gaza was declared by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification and at least 461 people have died from malnutrition-related causes.

50. In violation of its obligations to ensure adequate means of survival – as reaffirmed by the ICJ– the genocidal campaign by Israel has deliberately sought to destroy the humanitarian system sustaining the occupied population. It has done so through: (i) directly bombing UNRWA warehouses, food distribution sites, schools and clinics, killing more than 370 personnel; (ii) defamation campaigns against UNRWA, and (iii) promoting ad hoc pseudo-humanitarian agencies.

51. When Israel alleged, without evidence, that UNRWA staff were involved in the events of 7 October, 18 States immediately suspended funding, uncritically endorsing the Israeli Despite inconclusive investigations, the accused staff were fired and most donors took months to resume contributions to UNRWA. The United States, its largest donor, passed a law to prohibit US funding. When the Israeli Knesset took the unprecedented step of outlawing UNRWA operations by 30 January 2025, only some States took action by seeking an ICJ Advisory Opinion.

52. The brutal attack on the UN system was complemented by its attempted substitution with an Israel–US-controlled aid mechanism. The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) – conceived as early as December 2023, with US support and funding – used aid distribution, through military-run sites staffed with US mercenaries, to facilitate the forced displacement of Palestinians toward Egypt. This seemed to anticipate the so-called “Gaza Riviera” plan, which would have led to Palestinian forced displacement.

53. From March 2025 onwards, amid the total siege-induced famine and the destruction of 23 UNRWA sites in four months, 2,100 unarmed civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands were injured by Israeli forces and US contractors at GHF. Despite this, it was only after President Trump’s “peace plan” that the GHF was disbanded.

54. Instead of opposing this man-made humanitarian catastrophe, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Jordan and the United Kingdom, among others, parachuted aid into Gaza – an expensive, inadequate and dangerous. While purporting to be taking action to ease shortages, this only served to mislead international public opinion while the famine worsened. Naval aid missions to Gaza, attempts by civil society groups to break the siege have been unlawfully intercepted by Israel in international waters – amid silence and inaction by Third States.

55. At several crucial moments, instead of adhering to their legal obligations, Third States have assisted the deterioration of conditions of life, implicating them in the devastating impact caused to the civilian population in dire need.

A. Economic and Trade Relations: the fuel and profits of genocide

56. Israel is heavily reliant on international trade and economic Maintaining normal trade relations despite the illegality of its occupation and systematic human rights and humanitarian law violations – now escalated to genocide – legitimizes and sustains the Israeli apartheid regime. In 2024, international trade in goods and services equaled 54 percent of Israeli GDP (down from 61 percent in 2022). The EU, its largest trade partner, provided almost a third of total trade for the last two years.

57. Imports beyond weapons are vital to secure the goods necessary to sustain the illegal occupation and other unlawful Israeli policies and Many Israeli imports are dual- use goods, which can be used in the production of both civilian and military products. In 2024, these goods accounted for 31 percent of Israeli merchandise imports from the European Union.

58. Exports earned Israel US$474 billion in 2022–2024, fuelling the economy and the fiscal coffers and enhancing its arms manufacturing capacity through the exports of dual-use items. In 2023, integrated circuits became Israel’s top export accounting for 16 percent of Israeli merchandise exports (US$10 billion). Often marketed as civilian technologies, these dual-use items are essential to Israeli military systems that surveil, control and kill Palestinians, reinforcing a military–civilian economic symbiosis and Israel’s role in the global tech-arms. Precision-guided munitions, drones and missile defence systems all rely on such specialized circuits for navigation, radar and control.

59. Israeli trade is reinforced by at least 45 economic cooperation agreements, including with the EU, the US and the UAE (implementing the Abraham Accords). These agreements remove tariff and non-tariff barriers for dual-use and defence goods and services, while often failing to distinguish dealings with the oPt, implicitly recognizing Israeli authority over illegal settlers and their businesses and annexed land.

60. Economic cooperation also extends beyond trade. Since 2014, the European Commission Research and Innovation Framework (since 2021, Horizon Europe) has provided €2.1 billion in grants to Israeli entities in science, technology and innovation, many developing dual-use and military technologies. The programme’s European Innovation Council has also financed 34 Israeli companies with €550 million of equity and blended finance since 2021, making Israel among the highest per capita beneficiaries.

61. Since 1981, the European Investment Bank has financed Israeli entities with €2.7 billion, including €760 million in loans to Bank Leumi, listed on the OHCHR Database. Other agreements include the US–Israel BIRD and US–Israel BSF, the agreement between the Israeli Foreign Trade Risks Insurance Corporation and UAE Etihad Credit Insurance and the China–Israel Innovation Partnership.

62. States have largely avoided action to meet their legal obligations. No trade or economic agreement signed since 1967 has been Only a few States have reduced trade amid the ongoing genocide, most notably Türkiye, which announced the suspension of all trade with Israel in May 2024, resulting in a 64 percent reduction in Turkish-origin imports and near-total cessation of exports in January–August 2025, although some trade has reportedly continued indirectly. Meanwhile, other countries increased their trade with Israel during the genocide, including Germany (+US$836 million), Poland (+US$237 million), Greece (+US$186 million), Italy (+US$117 million), Denmark (+US$99 million), France (+US$75 million) and Serbia (+US$56 million), as well as Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates (+US$237 million), Egypt (+US$199 million), Jordan (+US$41 million) and Morocco (+US$6 million). This countered the trade decline Israel might otherwise have faced (–6 percent).

63. The obligation of Third States to act against international law violations is often incorporated into treaties. For instance, the 1996 Türkiye-Israel Free Trade Agreement conditions cooperation on respect of public policy, morality, international peace, and security. Similarly, the EU–Israel Association Agreement makes human rights and democratic principles an “essential elements clause”. However, these principles remain unfulfilled. A 2024 internal paper of the EU, leaked in August 2025, shows how the EU was determined to preserve business-as-usual despite evidence of Israeli violations of the terms of the agreement in the face of the illegal occupation and genocide. The proposal of the European Commission to cancel core trade preferences on 37 percent of Israeli exports to the EU still awaits approval.

64. Besides the suspension of the trade agreement with Israel, states must also suspend all trade with Israel in dual-use products, as the EU did with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. In the case of the EU, this represented 38 percent of all EU–Israel trade (US$17.5 billion) in 2024, based on the EU definition of dual use. The largest dual-use trade is in integrated circuits with Ireland, which increased from US$2.2 billion in 2022 to US$3.2 billion in 2024.

56. Energy trade has often been subject to embargoes aimed at bringing countries in line with their international legal obligations: examples include apartheid South Africa and, currently, Russia and Iran. In the case of Israel, only Colombia, which banned coal exports to Israel in 2024, has acted. Russia and the United States were major suppliers of refined fuel products to Israel, while Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Brazil and South Africa continued to supply Israel with essential raw materials. Countries such as Morocco, Italy, France and Türkiye have continued to provide key ports for products, including oil and gas. The European Union and Egypt have continued to import gas from Israel through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas pipeline, which illegally passes through the sea adjacent to the Gaza Strip, violating Palestinian sovereign rights. In August 2025, as starvation gripped Gaza, Egypt expanded its partnership with Israel through a US$35 billion natural gas deal – the largest export deal in Israeli history.

66. Trade and the supply of materials and weapons to Israel rely on Third States’ transportation infrastructure. Ports known to have facilitated the trans-shipment to Israel of F-35 parts, weapons, jet fuel, oil and/or other materials include Türkiye, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Greece, Morocco and the US. Airfields in Ireland, Belgium and the United States also support transfers. Many ports also facilitate Israeli gas exports, including via the EMG Pipeline to Port workers in

multiple countries blocked illicit trade in France, Belgium, Italy, Morocco, Sweden, Spain, Gibraltar, Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Crete and the United States. In response, ships and aircrafts often disable transponders to conceal routes: ports (e.g., Morocco) have rerouted shipments and some deliveries go through third-State traders. Belgium, Spain and others have worked to facilitate this transit.

I. Conclusion

67. The genocide in Gaza was not committed in isolation, but as part of a system of global Rather than ensuring that Israel respects the basic human rights and self-determination of the Palestinian people, powerful Third States – perpetuating colonial and racial-capitalist practices that should have long been consigned to history – have allowed violent practices to become an everyday reality. Even as the genocidal violence became visible, States, mostly Western ones, have provided, and continue to provide, Israel with military, diplomatic, economic and ideological support, even as it weaponized famine and humanitarian aid. The horrors of the past two years are not an aberration, but the culmination of a long history of complicity.

68. Third States’ acts, omissions and discourse in support of a genocidal apartheid State are such that they could and should be held liable for aiding, assisting or jointly participating in internationally wrongful acts, within a context of systematic violations of peremptory and erga omnes norms. At this critical juncture, it is imperative that Third States immediately suspend and review all military, diplomatic and economic relations with Israel, as any such engagement could represent means to aid/assist/directly participate in unlawful acts, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

70. Many Third States have operated with the very impunity they have granted Israel. Their disregard for international law undermines the foundations of the multilateral order painstakingly built over eight decades by States and people within the United This will stand in history as an offence not only to justice, but to the very idea of our common humanity. While justice must involve criminal trials – whether in international or domestic courts – accountability extends beyond prosecutions to include reparations: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, by Israel and by Third States that have supported its crimes. The power structures that enabled these heinous crimes must be dismantled, and the international justice system shows the way to do it.

72. The world is watching Gaza and the whole of Palestine. States must step up to their responsibilities. Only by fulfilling the Palestinian people’s right to self- determination, so brazenly violated by the ongoing genocide, can enduring coercive global structures be No state can credibly claim adherence to international law while arming, supporting or shielding a genocidal regime. All military and political support must be suspended; diplomacy should serve to prevent crimes rather than to justify them. Complicity in genocide must end.

VI. Recommendations

71. Recalling her previous recommendations, the Special Rapporteur reminds all States of their legal obligation not to participate in or be complicit with Israeli violations, and to instead prevent and address serious breaches of international law, particularly as set out in the UN Charter and Genocide Convention.

72. Given the enduring emergency unaddressed by current “peace” discussions and plans, the Special Rapporteur urges States to cause no further harm to the Palestinian people and to:

(a) Exert pressure for a complete and permanent ceasefire and full withdrawal of Israeli troops;

(b) Take immediate steps to end the siege in Gaza, including deploying naval and land convoys to ensure safe humanitarian access and mobile housing before winter;

(c) Support the re-opening of Gaza’s international airport and port to facilitate aid delivery.

73. Beyond the emergency, States must recognize Palestinian self-determination and justice as essential to lasting peace and security, and therefore:

(a) Suspend all military, trade and diplomatic relations with Israel;

(b) Investigate and prosecute all officials, corporates and individuals involved in or facilitating genocide, incitement, crimes against humanity and war crimes and other grave breaches of international humanitarian law;

(c) Secure reparations, including full reconstruction and return;

(d) Cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice;

(e) Reaffirm and strengthen support to UNRWA and the UN system as a whole;

(f) Suspend Israel from the United Nations under Article 6 of the UN Charter;

(g) Act under “Uniting for Peace”, in line with General Assembly resolution 377 (V), to ensure that Israel dismantles its occupation.

74. The Special Rapporteur also urges trade unions, lawyers, civil society and ordinary citizens to monitor States’ actions in response to these recommendations, and to continue to press institutions, governments and corporations for boycotts, divestments and sanctions, until the end of the Israeli illegal occupation and related

Document symbol: A/80/492
Download Document Files:  https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/a-80-492-advance-unedited-version.pdf
Document Type: Report
Document Sources: Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967
Subject: Apartheid, Armed conflict, Arms control and regional security issues, Ceasefire, Colonialism, Famine, Gaza Strip, Genocide, Human rights and international humanitarian law, Refugees and displaced persons, War crimes
Publication Date: 20/10/2025
URL source: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/a80492-gaza-genocide-collective-crime-report-special-rapporteur-situation

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Statement by the Representative of Thailand to the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children on the Escalation of Violence at the Thailand-Cambodia Border

27 July 2025

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Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia H.E. Dato’ Seri Utama Haji Mohamad Haji Hasan on Thailand – Cambodia border dispute

27 July 2025

https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/speeches-statements/-/asset_publisher/statement/content/statement-by-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-malaysia-h-e-dato-seri-utama-haji-mohamad-haji-hasan-on-thailand-cambodia-border-disputes

Malaysia, as Chair of ASEAN, is following with deep concern the clashes between Thailand and Cambodia’s military troops at the disputed border on 24 July 2025 which has resulted in casualties. We urge both parties to exercise utmost restraint and to take immediate steps to de-escalate tensions.

Malaysia wishes to underscore the importance of resolving the border dispute through dialogue and diplomacy in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity and good neighbourliness.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, has reached out to H.E. Hun Manet, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, and H.E. Phumtham Wechayachai, Acting Prime Minister of Thailand, and appealed directly to both leaders for an immediate ceasefire to prevent further hostilities and to create space for peaceful dialogue and diplomatic resolution. Malaysia stands ready to offer the assistance of the good offices of the ASEAN Chair in facilitating an amicable way forward to address the issue that is acceptable to both parties.

H.E. DATO’ SERI UTAMA HAJI MOHAMAD HAJI HASAN

PUTRAJAYA

25 JULY 2025

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MARUAH Statement on ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict

1 November 2023

MARUAH strongly condemns the abhorrent crimes against humanity in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and urges immediate action to alleviate the pain and suffering inflicted on innocent civilians and devastating humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

We urge all parties involved to respect and abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as Articles 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7. In particular, Article 5 states that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’.

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